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Abstract 
In this paper we assess the construct validity and theoretical emdeddedness of agent-based models of 
normative behaviour drawing on experimental social psychology. We contend that social psychology and 
agent-EDVHG PRGHOOLQJ VKDUH WKH IRFXV RI ¶REVHUYLQJ· WKH SURFHVVHV DQG outcomes of the interaction of 
individual agents. The paper focuses on two from a taxonomy of agent-based models of normative 
behaviour. This enables the identification of the assumptions the models are built on and in turn, reflection 
on the assumptions themselves from a socio-psychological perspective.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper assesses the theoretical embeddedness and construct validity of agent-based models of 
normative behaviour with respect to experimental social psychology.  
Agent-based modelling (ABM) is a computational method used to simulate social phenomena 
focusing on the interactions of individual agents (see for example Gilbert, 2008). Construct validity 
is a term usually applied to the measurement of concepts in quantitative social research. In ABM the 
problem is not principally one of measurement but whether the operationalisations of concepts are 
appropriate. A theoretical embedding relates the concepts used in ABM to theories in social 
psychology.  
Our work can be seen as an extension to recent work on the construct validity of ABM of 
normative behaviour (Neumann, 2010). Whilst Neumann focuses on individual psychology and 
problems of norm internalisation, we focus on social psychology. Although individual psychology is 
of great importance for the explanation of normative behaviour when it comes to internalisation, 
social psychology is more appropriate as a theoretical backdrop to ABM. 
The need for a theoretical embedding and an assessment of the construct validity of ABM arises 
from the tricky task of verifying that a model corresponds to its target system. A model is an 
abstraction from reality. Decisions about which features to keep as salient and which ones to strip 
are often informed by the use of the model. For example, a model airplane might have the colour 
and proportions of a real airplane but none of its flying behaviour, whilst a flight simulator for a 
Boeing 747 simulates the flying behaviour but not the materiality of the real plane. Thus, when 
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modelling we need to keep in mind what a specific model is for and what a model is of. ABM, like 
any good science, needs to be validated with appropriate models of target systems. This can be 
done at different levels of abstraction. For some simulations detailed data are at hand to which a 
model·s behaviour can be compared, but for others the model outcome can only be compared to 
more general system behaviour. In the study of norms, empirical validation is particularly difficult 
because phenomena associated with norms (e.g. local conformity, global diversity) are general 
rather than based on specific data.  
We use experimental social psychology as the theoretical backdrop of ABM for three reasons: the 
first is the procedural similarity which seems to underpin the experimental paradigm in social 
psychology and ABM both of which test social behaviour (direct or indirect interaction between 
agents) and its consequences by manipulating various (behavioural and contextual-situational) 
conditions. 
Second, the choice of experimental social psychology is informed by the wide reach that 
experimental findings had in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s and the resilience of the experimental 
approach in social and group influence research to date. Social psychology constitutes the dominant 
framework for conceptualising normative behaviour, thus inspiring ways to approach the study of 
norms in the social sciences. Although Critical Social Psychology, which has developed as a critique 
to experimental social psychology, has emerged as the ¶new mainstream· in social psychology 
(Ibanez, 1997; for an overview of critical social psychology, see inter alia Howitt et al., 1989; 
Wetherell, 1996), experimental social psychology has merit for making connections with ABM on 
social norms. 
Finally, much of ABM work is based on assumptions that can be traced back to experimental social 
psychology. With regards to the study of social norms in particular, three normative behaviours 
have been identified in experimental investigations of social and group influence in social 
psychology: obedience, conformity and compliance. In Section 4 we relate ABM to these concepts 
of normative behaviour. 
The paper is structured as follows. We briefly describe the methodology of agent-based modelling 
in Section 2, present a tripartite classification of agent-based models of norms and focus on two 
models in order to discuss theoretical embeddedness and construct validity. Section 3 discusses 
norms research in social psychology, presenting a classification of normative behaviour in terms of 
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conformity, obedience and compliance. In Section 4 we position ourselves with regards to these 
models. We reflect on the two models and point at a shortcoming in ABM in not modelling 
compliance. Section 5 concludes and points to future work.  
2. Agent-based Modelling 
Agent-based modelling has been a ground breaking methodological innovation, introducing a new, 
model-centred epistemology in social science. Narrative methods and/or empirical data alone seem 
inadequate to capture the complexity of social phenomena. Here complexity refers to multiple, 
asymmetric, non-linear interactions between autonomous, heterogeneous agents with bounded 
rationality and incomplete knowledge about the behaviour of the whole system in which they are 
embedded. The most indicative manifestation of complexity is that simple activities between agents 
contribute to the emergence of complex social phenomena that cannot be reduced to the 
behaviours of individual agents (cf. Squazzoni, forthcoming). ABM is a methodology that integrates, 
tests and extends theoretical explanations of social phenomena. It also represents and tries to 
understand social phenomena grounded in empirical data by capturing their connections and 
processes. However, the relationship between theory-model-phenomena is not consistently 
represented in agent-based models (see Squazzoni, forthcoming; Epstein, 2006; Henrickson and 
McKelvey, 2002). 
ABM could be considered the `virtual laboratory of the social sciences· as it allows for the 
controlled variation of parameters, identification of mechanisms and testing of theories similar to 
laboratory experiments in the natural sciences. Agent-based models are computer programs 
consisting of a number of autonomous, heterogeneous agents interacting with an environment and 
with each other. Autonomy means that there is no centralised decision maker. Each agent has its own 
set of plans, rules and parameters determining its behaviour. Agents can be heterogeneous in their 
attributes and preferences as well as in their behavioural rules. For example, in an ABM of the 
English housing market (Gilbert, 2008), there are agents acting as buyers, sellers and realtors 
(estate agents) according to different behaviour rules. The agents also have different incomes and 
savings and are at different stages of the housing ladder (e.g. first time buyers). The environment in 
an agent-based model can represent several different things such as a geography of resources (e.g. 
houses, food), a social space (e.g. networks), or something more abstract like an opinion or 
information space. Agents move about in space, both changing the space (e.g. consuming 
resources) and reacting to it. Agents also interact with each other, e.g. exchanging information or 
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one imitating another. Given these ingredients many macro phenomena can be generated from the 
interactions of agents at the micro level. ABMs have successfully been employed in the study of 
opinion dynamics, technology adoption, markets, innovation networks and, our focus in this 
article, the study of normative behaviour. 
2.1 Agent-Based Models of Norms  
ABM have their origin in three different research camps; game theory, the natural sciences and 
distributed artificial intelligence (DAI). Models originating from game theory are studied to 
examine how cooperation can emerge from the interaction of selfish agents. The search is for payoff 
structures, incentives and disincentives that produce pro-social behaviour. The most famous 
examples of the integration of game theory into simulations is Axelrod·s work on the emergence 
and evolution of norms (Axelrod, 1984; 1986).  
The strand of modelling coming from the natural sciences uses work on ecology, population 
dynamics, or particle physics to model human behaviour. The fundamental idea is that there are 
many complex phenomena in the natural world and that we can use these complexities to analyse 
the social world. Many cellular automata models such as the game of life (Berlekamp et al., 1982) 
or zero intelligence models of economic markets (Mirowski, 1999) result from this approach. 
The DAI strand starts from a systems perspective. The aim of traditional AI is to find solutions for 
complex problems by the application of ¶intelligence·. Some problems have been recognised as 
either unsolvable or as being less effectively solved by a single, monolithic system. DAI developed 
decentralised solutions for some of these problems. Rather than modelling a system as a whole, 
autonomous component parts are modelled, producing solutions via their interaction (Woolridge, 
2002).  
These three origins differ markedly in terms of their view, use and appreciation of norms.  Agent-
based simulations of norms also vary according to which strand they are closer to. We can 
distinguish three basic kinds of agent-based simulations of norms and roughly attribute them to the 
three origins as in Table 1.  
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Table 1: Models of Norms, Aims and Origins 
Models of the Emergence of Norms  Game theory 
Models of the Diffusion of Norms  Natural Sciences 
Models of the Use/Application of Norms Distributed Artificial Intelligence 
 
It is unclear that the term ´normµ differs widely from one field to another. Compare three 
definitions from the three fields: 
 
´A norm exists in a given social setting to the extent that individuals usually act in a 
certain way and are often punished when seen not to be acting in this way.µ (Axelrod, 
1986, p. 1097) 
 
´First, [social norms] are self enforcing behavioural regularities. But second, once 
entrenched, we conform without thinking about it.µ (Epstein, 2001, p. 1) 
 
´A normative system is a social construction a society of agents uses to achieve a 
certain social order.µ (van der Torre and Boella, 2004, p. 201) 
 
One could say that the three definitions simply focus on different aspects of norms, depending on 
their particular research question regarding normative behaviour (origin, diffusion or application). 
However, these definitions appear in the literature without caveats that a specific subdomain of 
norms is of interest. Along with the definition of norms and normative behaviour come 
assumptions about the agents and their interactions. These are the assumptions that need to be 
stated explicitly and, where possible, integrated into theory.  
We now discuss two influential models from the ABM literature from which the two first 
definitions are taken. We shall not discuss a model of the last kind in detail for reasons of space, but 
shall return to a DAI model briefly in Section 4.   
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2.2 Emergence of Norms 
One of the most famous simulations of norm emergence is Axelrod·s (1984; 1986). Based on game 
theory, agents have a choice between two strategic actions: to cooperate/defect and to punish/not-
punish if they observe a defection. The strategy is determined by two parameters: boldness (risk 
accepted for defection) and vengefulness (likelihood of punishing a defecting agent). By definition 
cooperation is more costly than defection and being punished is more costly than cooperation. 
There is also a cost associated with punishing a defector (rather than turning a blind eye).  
 
 
F igure 1:  Axel rod¶s Norm and Meta-Norm Game 
 
Axelrod·s original experiments define agents that play 1000 rounds of prisoners· dilemma games. 
When the norm game is played, i.e. defectors are punished at the cost of the punisher, the outcome 
of the simulation experiments is that norms ultimately collapse. The vengefulness of the population 
initially reduces defection but after a period of norm adherence, vengefulness levels fall, leading to 
a rise in defection and irretrievable norm breakdown. Axelrod then adds a meta-norm game, in 
which an agent that is observed not punishing a defector is punished. In this simulation, cooperation 
and thus a stable norm emerges, under a wide range of initial conditions. There has been some 
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criticism of Axelrod·s simulations, showing that the meta-norm game also breaks down eventually 
and that a much larger number of agents produce relevantly different results (Mahmoud, 2010).  
The meta-norm simulation assumes: a) Hobbesian view of human nature as selfish and needing to 
be constrained, b) norms are necessarily costly for the individual, c) norms are sustained by 
punishment, and d) the decision to cooperate or defect is a simple calculation and not dependent on 
the social setting (that is, there is no influence from other agents except for the possibility of 
punishment). 
2.3 Norm Adoption and Diffusion 
Models concerned with norm adoption and diffusion do not ask how general normative behaviour 
emerges but how a specific norm might be chosen and then diffuse through a population. There are 
several different kinds of diffusion model. Some are based on social learning (e.g. Lorscheid, 2009), 
some on memetics and imitation (e.g. Gatherer, 2002, Flentge, 2001) and some on opinion 
dynamics (e.g. Deffuant et al., 2002). Both imitation and opinion dynamics models have their 
theoretical foundations in natural science dynamic models rather than the social sciences. Social 
learning models are a recent development relying on cognitively more complex agents than 
traditional ABM.1 
As an example of a model of diffusion, we focus on one described by Epstein (2000). Epstein states 
two macro phenomena of normative behaviour: a) norms are locally stable, i.e. a group of agents 
close to each other adhere to the same norms and b) norms are globally diverse. A micro 
assumption of the model is that agents adhere to norms ´without thinking about themµ. Epstein 
operationalises this assumption as varying computing power of the agents. The model starts by 
assigning a binary norm and a norm change mechanism to agents. Norm change depends on two 
variables: the local environment and the amount of thinking about behaviour an agent does. At each 
step, every agent checks the norm of its neighbours within a personal vision radius. If the agent is in 
accord with its surrounding it keeps its norm and decreases its vision radius (less thinking). If it is 
not in accord it changes the norm and increases its vision radius (more thinking). The model·s 
results show the desired macro-behaviour, leading to local conformity and global diversity of 
norms. Agents at the heart of a norm no longer think about their behaviour whereas those at the 
                                                                                                                
1 See Section 4 for a brief discussion.   
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borderline between norms have to choose between competing local norms. The model also 
captures the re-emergence of norm differentiation after a ¶revolution·, a shock to the system.  
The model assumes: a) the automatic adoption of the majority norm, b) the non-thinking when 
agents are in a stable norm-environment, c) the non-enforcement of norms.  
These two models, one drawing from game theory and the other from statistical physics, will serve 
as examples for the following discussion of the agent-based modelling approach to understanding 
normative behaviour.  In the next section, we consider how social psychology has treated 
explaining normative behaviour. 
3. Social Psychology 
Social psychology departed from psychology in treating the ¶social· as a key element of 
psychological processes. According to social psychology, psychological processes are both social and 
cognitive. These are premises shared by agent-based modelling with its focus on agent interaction. 
Social processes are the ways in which perceptions, thoughts, emotions, memories, motives and 
actions are influenced by other people such as friends, personal relationships or family. Cognitive 
processes are the ways in which perceptions, thoughts and memories guide our understanding of 
the world.  
3.1 Social Psychological Approaches to Norms 
The study of norms and normative behaviour in social psychology is a branch of social influence 
research ² research into the ways people affect the thoughts, feelings and behaviours of others. 
Social cognition perspectives on social influence, using experimental (and, later, field) methods, 
have dominated the study of norms. The classic experimental studies lead to a tripartite 
classification into conformity, obedience and compliance.  
Conformity refers to yielding to perceived group pressure by copying the behaviour and beliefs of 
others (Franzoi, 2000). An agent conforms if it simply follows the behaviour of other agents. An 
agent can conform to a majority or a subgroup of the population. We drive on the left hand side of 
the road when in Great Britain but on the right on the European continent. We might wear 
bumbags and socks when on holiday in Italy just like other tourists or wear sunglasses and black like 
the Italians do. In either case, we conform to a subset of the population. 
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Conformity research has its foundations in Sherif·s (1936) Norm Development Research, which 
consisted of lab experiments on optical illusions (the Autokinetic Effect) without prior information 
or a frame of reference. The conclusion drawn was that where reality is ambiguous and fluid, 
people develop and internalise shared ¶frames of reference· to introduce order, stability and 
coherence into their relations with the stimulus world and each other (Sherif, 1936; see discussion 
in Turner, 1991). This line of research emphasised the development of norms as a consequence of 
informational influence that is, the desire to obtain useful/accurate information and, thus, achieve a 
correct or appropriate result. 
Asch (1952) disagreed with the idea that group influence is arbitrary and hypothesised that when 
reality is not ambiguous and individuals are presented with ¶facts·, they would not conform to a 
developing consensual norm but will remain independent. In his Line Judgment Experiments he 
showed (in one third of the trials) that norms are not shared frames of reference but group 
evaluations of what is right and wrong. Conforming to these norms involves converging individual 
perceptions and behaviour to that of the group. In other words, Asch·s work underlined the 
element of group pressure in the formation and conformity to a norm over that of consensual and 
unanimous formation and conformity (Sherif, 1936). Thus, this line of research emphasised the 
development and conformity to norms as a consequence of normative influence, the tendency to 
conform in order to gain social acceptance and avoid social rejection or conflict. 
More recent research has concluded that over time social norms become associated with specific 
settings. The situation (stimuli) ¶activates· remembered mental representations of normative 
behaviours (e.g. Stereotype Activation) (Dijksterhuis and Bargh, 2001; Aarts and Dijksterhuis, 
2003). These are also called ¶situational· norms and are activated in anticipation of entering a 
particular ² already experienced ² situation, e.g. being quiet when entering a place of prayer or a 
library. This research stressed how social norms become diffused and thus normative behaviour 
itself becomes routine, being executed without involving conscious thought. 
Obedience refers to the performance of an action in response to a direct order or command. An 
agent obeys a norm if there is an authority enforcing the norm, e.g. by punishment. The 
punishment can be applied by a small group or even a single person with authority, for example, 
the police or a father. Punishment can also be applied by ostracism by the agent·s community. We 
do not jump a red light when driving because we are afraid of being caught and fined by the police.  
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The classic research on obedience is that of Milgram (1974), which consisted of lab experiments 
involving subjects role-playing ¶teachers· and ¶learners·. Physical punishment in the form of electric 
shocks was administered by teachers to learners when instructed by the experimenter. The 
¶learners· played an act of being shocked but did not receive real shocks. The experiments indicated 
the pervasiveness of social power and status in situations of obedience. Authority, such as playing 
the role of experimenter, increases the likelihood that commands will be obeyed.  
Obedience is treated as a demand on the agent to make a binary choice. If the external pressure 
becomes too big and is exercised by a more ¶powerful· agent, the agent will change its behaviour 
and obey the norm. The agent needs to understand the cost of defying a norm, i.e. the possibility of 
punishment. Nothing seems to change in the agent between the pre-norm adoption and post-norm 
adoption state (see Milgram, 1974; cf. Gibson and Haritos-Fatouros, 1986). Norm adherence is 
fully determined externally. Analyses of norms that assume that agents follow the mechanism of 
obedience are theories based on a Hobbesian conception of society constraining the individual, such 
as Rational Choice theory and game theory (e.g. Coleman, 1990; Bichieri, 2006). These theories, 
relying on individualism, have been accused of not taking the social influence on agents seriously.  
Compliance refers to acting publicly in accord with a direct request or suggestion. Compliance is 
often treated as deliberate social influence (Hewstone et al., 2008) in the sense that individuals 
make conscious and deliberate attempts to gain the social approval of others. Factors that foster 
compliance are positive moods (likelihood of compliance when in good mood), reciprocity (the 
expectation that one should return a favour or a good deed), and giving reasons (explanations that 
make requests reasonable. All come with the precondition of equal social status amongst the 
individuals who interact, as otherwise compliance might reduce to obedience (Franzoi, 2000; cf. 
Moscovici, 1976). Compliance entails an assessment of the situation, thus individuals behave as 
participants rather than recipients in social encounters. An agent complies with a norm if it follows 
it while being able to consider other behaviours. To comply contains the element of choice, that is, 
to comply with something now but not later or to comply with something superficially but ¶not 
really·. As compliance is associated with publicly acting in a certain way whilst retaining one·s 
personal beliefs, we might comply with wearing a suit to work although we would never wear 
formal clothes otherwise.  
In experimental terms, compliance is a more complex form of norm adherence than the other two 
forms. Although in conformity the agent·s mental change is complete and in obedience there is no 
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change at all, compliance involves the possibility of gradual change. The concession of the 
individual to social pressure while attempting to maintain their individual values, may have the 
effect of gradually changing their values. Compliance demands representations of the world ¶given 
compliance· and the world ¶without compliance· and involves agents making behaviour choices that 
are sensitive to the context. It also demands intentionality; the agent deliberately decides whether 
to comply with a norm or not. The interplay of these representations and the intentionality and 
context-sensitivity of behaviour choices is where the interesting feedback between the individual 
and society lies.  
4. Reflections on Experimental Social Psychology and Agent-based Modelling 
Examining the assumptions of the two agent-based models of normative behaviour discussed above, 
we find that Axelrod·s model is based on the obedience paradigm and Epstein·s on the conformity 
paradigm. If we go back to Axelrod·s and Epstein·s definitions of norms quoted above, we see that 
Axelrod·s definition of a norm as something that ´exists in a given social setting to the extent that 
individuals usually act in a certain way and are often punished when seen not to be acting in this 
wayµ relates to obedience through the punishment aspect, although it leaves out other salient 
features of obedience such as authority and social hierarchy. Epstein·s conceptualisation of norms as 
´self enforcing behavioural regularities [...] entrenched without thinking about themµ is very close 
to the recent research on thoughtless conformity (Dijksterhuis and Bargh, 2001; Aarts and 
Dijksterhuis, 2003). 
Considering these two models through the lens of experimental social psychology·s notions of 
norms highlights some failings in the ways that the models implement normative behaviour. For 
instance, treating conformity as behaviour implying thoughtlessness has been a matter for criticism 
of mainstream experimental social psychology (see Howitt et al., 1989; Wetherell, 1996; Lesko, 
2003) and these criticisms can be extended to the agent-based models. Moreover, the models do 
not even fulfil their potential of representing the essentially dynamic nature of the development of 
norms. For example, conformity is a gradual process taking a finite time, while both models 
implement conformity as an instantaneous switch from one behaviour to another. Systematic 
exposure to obedience structures may be needed to induce conformity, particularly in 
institutionalised settings (e.g. training a torturer, Gibson and Haritos-Fatouros, 1986; 1971 
Stanford Prison Experiment, Zimbardo, 2007).  
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In addition, identities and roles need to be taken into account. Thus rather than treating behaviour 
as determined by the individual agent·s state plus the situation, the different meanings that a 
situation may have for different agents in different roles and with different histories need to be 
taken into account. If one does so, behavioural consequences might be expected to emerge, such as 
varieties of non-conformity ² not doing what is expected owing to personal, situational, cultural 
factors (see Franzoi, 2000) ² and minority influence ² a faction within a group influencing the group 
during decision making (Moscovici, 1976). The type of norm is another factor to be considered 
when studying normative behaviour. For example, it may be easier to conform to perceptions of 
the physical world or to driving on the right than to particular social values (Smith, 1998).  
Agent-based models of normative behaviour undermine the ¶social· and do not embed agents in the 
social processes they are part of. Axelrod·s model takes the ¶social· out of the mix by modelling 
individual responses to punishment. Epstein·s model takes the ¶social· out because there is nothing 
distinctly specific to human agents in how norms spread in his model. In this way, a division 
between the individual and the social, and between agency and structure is maintained. Social 
influence processes are social practices and social interactions and should be modelled as an agent 
interaction outcome if we wish to do better than produce explanations that reproduce the 
individual and the social, agency and structure as distinct entities.  
Although, we have discussed two models, we have presented three approaches of norm adherence 
in experimental social psychology (conformity, obedience and compliance). The reason why we did 
not discuss a specific model exemplifying compliance is that we believe there is, as yet, no such 
model. It is to models based on distributed artificial intelligence that we should look to find models 
based on compliance, because compliance requires that we model cognition, and only DAI models 
offer this possibility. The current model that comes closest to representing compliance is the agent 
architecture EMIL-A (Andrighetto et al., 2007) and the corresponding simulations. This 
architecture enables the agent to adopt new norms from the outside world and integrate them into 
its decision procedure. For example, the EMIL simulation of normative learning incorporates 
reinforcement learning, social approval and sanction into the agent·s decision-making (Lorscheid, 
2009). A particularly interesting aspect is what the authors call the penitence level of an agent. 
Penitence is a heterogeneous agent variable (ranging from embarrassed, through guilty, to 
impervious). Depending on the penitence level, agents can resist changing their internal values in 
the face of more or less negative norm invocation messages. Thus, although the agent now has the 
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possibility of keeping its initial norms for a time and slowly adopting new norms, the mechanism 
underlying it is a sort of punishment formalised in the norm invocation messages and the penitence 
level. An extension to the architecture might be able to display the context sensitivity necessary for 
norm compliance.  
5. Conclusions and Future Work  
We have shown that a theoretical embedding of ABM in concepts drawn from experimental social 
psychology can be useful for the validation of normative models. Current models focus on one kind 
of norm adherence only, emergence models on obedience and diffusion models on conformity. 
Compliance is not yet tackled by ABM, although there is recent work going in that direction (e.g. 
Andrighetto et al., 2007) and there are rich opportunities for developing this approach. For 
example, modelling compliance would entail simulating an individual·s negotiation of the personal 
(desires, beliefs), the interpersonal (the meaning of the situation, social roles, norms, and the 
meaning of norms) and the experiential (memory) (drawing on Howitt et al., 1989).  
We are looking to develop the work on compliance in more depth to lay open the challenges it 
poses to ABM, in particular the need for modelling the cognition of an agent. In this paper, we have 
focussed only on experimental social psychology. In future research, we shall also consider the 
contributions of other strands of social psychology. For example critical social psychology has a 
dynamic view of norms, something in tune with ABM, given that the normative behaviour can be 
generated dynamically by modelling.  
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